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Abstract. Internet of Things (IoT) can be seen as the main driver to-
wards an era of ubiquitous computing. Taking into account the scale of
IoT, the number of security issues that emerge are unprecedented, there-
fore the need for proposing new methodologies for elaborating about
security in IoT systems is undoubtedly crucial and this is recognised by
both academia and the industry alike. In this work we present Appa-
ratus, a conceptual model for reasoning about security in IoT systems
through the lens of Security Requirements Engineering. Apparatus is
architecture-oriented and describes an IoT system as a cluster of nodes
that share network connections. The information of the system is docu-
mented in a textual manner, using Javascript Notation Object (JSON)
format, in order to elicit security requirements. To demonstrate its usage
the security requirements of a temperature monitor system are identified
and a first application of Apparatus is exhibited.
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1 Introduction
One of the areas that attract attention from the research and industry worlds is
Internet of Things (IoT). Weiser in 1991 [1], provides one of the most accurate
yet simple vision of IoT by stating that the most profound technologies merge
with the environment. Technology will be so evident that we will start perceiving
it as a natural part of life. Indeed IoT along with cloud computing can turn the
last statement into reality.
Despite IoT popularity a number of security challenges faced in these environ-
ments have already been revealed [2–5]. A prominent security concern, found in
the surveys, are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in embedded devices [6]. Such de-
vices lack the necessary resources to withstand repeated requests from malicious
3 The original publication is available at www.link.springer.com.
attackers. Another commonly identified issue are Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks [7], that take advantage of either weak encryption algorithms of embed-
ded devices or weak authentication mechanisms among the systems [8]. Security
specialists argue that the most effective way of ensuring security in systems is
to incorporate security focused practices in the development cycle. As a prac-
tice, it ensures that the product will meet specific security standards, which in
turn will ensure its robustness when it is actively deployed in real life scenar-
ios. The practice of including secure practices in the development cycle is also
advocated by the field of requirements engineering. Requirements engineering is
applied along with the stakeholders early in the development cycle to identify
security requirements [9]. To this end, our main concern in this paper is to pro-
pose a novel conceptual model that can be used by software designers in order
to extract respective security requirements based on the system’s architectural
information, in addition to stakeholder needs.
To tackle the issue of requirements elicitation in IoT systems we propose
Apparatus. The speculation is, that if an IoT system is analysed in an abstract
manner, the technical specifications of each scenario should not be relevant in
security analysis. Moreover their core security requirements should be universal
to any IoT system. Apparatus is a conceptual model to enable reasoning about
security in IoT using information from the architecture of the system. From
that information, security requirements can be elicited. Security analysis in the
architectural level offers both advantages and limitations. The architecture of a
system offers information valuable for security analysis, such as types of network
connections between node or their role in the network. On the other hand, certain
aspects of the system are not expressed such as users or malicious attackers. To
better identify the limitations, the concept of a “microworld” is introduced, where
the security analysis is being conducted in a managed environment. To mitigate
the limitations identified in the “microworld”, Apparatus will be integrated to
other security requirements engineering methods. The reasoning behind adopt-
ing Apparatus as a core model is that it can be integrated to other security
frameworks. Therefore there is no need to introduce a new framework to the al-
ready many existing security requirements frameworks (e.g., [10–14]) that have
been in active development for a number of years and offer a comprehensive and
robust security analysis. Their expertise will be better utilized if Apparatus
acts as a “bridge” to other security requirements methods for IoT rather than it
being developed as separate entity.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the related work in
the fields of IoT and Security Requirements Engineering. Section 3 presents the
conceptual model ofApparatus. Section 4 shows a security analysis of an IoT
system using the Apparatus security reasoning. Section 5 discusses future ex-
tensions of Apparatus along with its limitations and also concludes this paper.
2 Related work
Security requirements engineering has been used in a variety of systems and
fields in order to analyse security during the development cycle. Although there
are many surveys on identifying security issues in IoT [2–5], few attempts have
been made to address them from a security requirements engineering point of
view.
An attempt to provide a framework for security and privacy in IoT systems
using requirements engineering was made by Alqassem [15]. He identifies the
complexity of analysing security in IoT systems and he states that the key com-
ponents in IoT are only two: RFID systems and sensor networks. To reason about
security in IoT they propose the use of the i∗ framework in order to undertake
security analysis in future case studies. The paper does not consider other tech-
nologies and topologies that are being used in IoT. IoT is not restricted only to
RFID systems, but uses any communication technology, such as Wi-Fi, NFC or
Bluetooth. Moreover the architectural topologies are not restricted to networks
solely comprised by sensors, but include any type of device.
IoT as a whole is composed by a multitude of devices. A large number of
those devices are embedded devices. An informative paper from Gürgens de-
scribes a vision in applying security engineering to embedded systems [16]. He
identifies a number of security challenges of embedded systems, that should be
addressed in order to have a secure system. He reasons that specific security
requirements tools should be designed, tailored to the needs of embedded sys-
tems. Another framework aiming to provide security in embedded IoT systems
is proposed by Babar [17]. In his paper he classifies the types of attacks aimed
at IoT systems. He proposes a basic three step security framework to elicit re-
quirements in embedded systems. To accomplish that he identifies the building
blocks of embedded systems in IoT. Tian designs a security framework specific
to wireless sensor networks [18]. The framework proposes a system architecture,
that is broken down into eight modules, with each module having specific func-
tionality to mitigate security issues. To summarize, the presented works do not
view IoT in a comprehensive manner, since they only aim to mitigate security
issues in specific areas. Therefore, they cannot be used to offer a universal secu-
rity analysis to any IoT scenario, but only aim to address specific instances of
IoT systems.
Díaz identifies a number of issues and open challenges with the integration
of IoT and Cloud computing [19]. Many functionalities of Internet of Things are
only possible through the cloud infrastructure. Some scenarios may require the
use of sensors as a service, while others may use cloud services for processing
functionality. He states that IoT will function as the middle-ware that will trans-
mit all its data to the cloud for processing. The paper shows that the current
trend for IoT application development is based on Cloud computing.
Although outside the scope of requirements engineering, a framework for
modeling and assessing security in IoT system is proposed by Ge [13]. The frame-
work uses a graphical security model that evaluates the level of security using
security metrics. The framework assesses security of IoT systems in a compre-
hensive manner and is not limited to specific IoT scenarios, such as embedded
systems or RFID systems. A similar universal comprehensive approach in secu-
rity of IoT is used in Apparatus, in order to reason about security requirements
in any IoT system, but from a requirements engineering point of view.
3 Presentation of Apparatus reasoning
Apparatus is a conceptual model for reasoning about security in IoT systems. In
the context of Apparatus, security requirements are defined as a restriction
related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability, which can
influence the analysis and design of a multiagent system under development by
restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the re-
quirements of the system, or by refining some of the system’ s objectives, an
approach used by Secure Tropos concept of security constrain [12]. A similar
definition of security requirements is given by Haley [14]. He defines them as
constraints on the system’s functional requirements, rather than being themselves
functional requirements. The current version of Apparatus focuses on the pro-
posed conceptual model, as shown in Fig. 1, through which designers can be
assisted on capturing the necessary knowledge from the IoT system’s architec-
ture perspective in order to identify and extract security requirements. In order
to achieve that, the information of the IoT system has to be presented in a
specific format that will make the extraction of security requirements straight-
forward. The model does not aim to provide a detailed security analysis in any
given IoT scenario. It provides the necessary information, for an IoT system to
be secure in a “microworld”, where users, malicious attackers and other commu-
nication with the world outside of the system are not part of the requirements
elicitation. In order to provide a more detailed security analysis, Apparatus
will be integrated with other security requirements methods, such as Secure
Tropos [11] and SQUARE [10]. Security analysis in IoT systems can be per-
formed in a two step approach. Apparatus will be used as the first step in
the security analysis, where its security requirements are derived from the IoT
architecture. The second step will be the usage of one of the aforementioned
methods so as to facilitate a more complete security analysis of the system. The
integration of Apparatus to other methods will be part of future work and is
out of the scope of this paper. The proposed conceptual model of Apparatus
is presented in Fig. 1 using an Entity-Relationship Diagram with crow’s foot
notation.
Apparatus is an architecture-oriented model, where an IoT system is de-
scribed as a cluster of IoT nodes connected to each other using network connec-
tions. Each IoT node has a set of properties that describe its functionality in the
system. The properties include information such as the type of the device and
its role within the system. There are two main concepts in Apparatus: the IoT
node and the network connection.
Each of the main concepts has a set of properties that further describes
the system. The properties of the IoT node are: (1) identification: gives an
Fig. 1. Conceptual model of Apparatus in Entity-Relationship Diagram
id to each of the stakeholders of the node. The stakeholders are four, user,
deployer, developer, manufacturer ; (2) aspect: declares whether the IoT node
is a single node, or composed of sub nodes. (3) layer: the layer of the IoT
architecture to which the node belongs; (4) type: what kind of device the node
is; (5) attribute: the type of role or operation that the node performs for the
network; (6) input: what is required in order for the node to perform its role or
operation; (7) output: the result of the node’s operation or role. The IoT nodes
are connected to each other using network connections. The type of connections
can be two: (1) Wireless: signifying a connection using a wireless protocol and
(2) Cable: signifying a connection using a wired medium.
Each node property can only hold a single value. If an IoT node that has
more than one functionality, needs to be defined, it can be broken down into the
same number of sub nodes as the functionalities we want to express. For example
a laptop that acts both as processing server and as the system’s database, will be
composed of two sub nodes. One sub node that describes the server functionality
and one sub node that describes the database functionality. These two sub nodes
in return make the laptop IoT node. Identical nodes in an IoT system, such
sensors and actuators can be grouped together and presented as a single node.
The properties of the IoT node are explained in detail: Identification: There
are four types of stakeholders in an IoT network, user (user of the node), de-
ployer (installer of the node), developer (producer of the software of the node),
manufacturer (hardware producer of the node). In Apparatus each of the stake-
holders that is involved in an IoT system is assigned a unique ID. That ID is
used to identify a stakeholder’s role in an IoT node and takes an integer value.
Aspect: The property aspect can take one of two values. The node can either
be a physical node, that declares the IoT node as a single node in the system, or
as a virtual node, meaning that the node belongs to a set of virtual nodes that
in turn compose a single physical node.
Layers: Apparatus uses a three-layer architecture that consists of the Ap-
plication Layer, Network Layer and the Perception Layer [20, 21]. Other archi-
tectures provide more levels of abstractions. For example a SOA based approach
identifies five layers, application, service composition, service management, ob-
ject abstraction, objects [2]. Another approach identifies more layers, that are
application, middleware, coordination, backbone network, existed alone network,
access layer, edge technology [22]. The proposed architectures for Internet of
Things have yet to fuse into a reference model [23], for that reason we chose the
three-layer approach. It provides the necessary properties for reasoning about se-
curity, while allowing to be extended if more levels of abstraction are introduced
into the reference model of IoT.
Type: Defines the device the IoT node represents. For example the type of
an IoT node could be a sensor, an actuator or a mobile phone as shown in Fig. 1.
Attribute: Describes the functionality of a node in the system. Examples of
a node’s functionality are shown in Fig. 1. Some attributes are better suited to
specific types of nodes. For example a talker node is a type of sensor, that only
sends information to the network and does not perform any actions. A listener
node is a type of actuator, that only performs actions and does not send any
information from the environment. A bipolar is a node that is both a talker and
a listener. When an IoT node is composed of virtual nodes, the attribute of their
physical node is multiple functions.
Input & Output: Have the same set of values. As mentioned before the
input signifies the required data for the node in order to produce the desired
output. The value could be a loose term such as data, or a notification as shown
presented in Fig. 1.
Network connection: The construct network connection represents the
type of the network link between nodes. The link can either be wireless, such
as via Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and RFID, or using a cable, such as an Ethernet and
a USB. From a high level security point of view, there is little difference if a
technology such as Wi-Fi over Bluetooth is used. Since they both are wireless
mediums, they share the same security requirements. The same applies to cable
mediums. From a low level perspective what technology is used, has a pivotal
role, since each one has specific vulnerabilities. That level of reasoning is not
present in the current version of Apparatus.
Apparatus currently represents information in a textual format, since it
will be used by machines for automated security analysis. An IoT system that
has been described using Apparatus, is formatted as a Javascript Notation
Object (JSON) file. JSON format is an Open Standard used to transmit data
objects consisting of attribute–value pairs. The “attribute” is immutable and
corresponds to the names of the IoT node’s properties. The “value” is mutable
and corresponds to the values of the IoT node’s properties. Apparatus uses
that formatting style in order to correlate the information of the IoT system
with the necessary security requirements. Using JSON format the process of
requirements elicitation can be automated, thus making the analysis of large
IoT networks more efficient. That type of formatting is useful for establishing
Fig. 2. Skeleton JSON template
a more formal rule-based approach for correlating security requirements with
properties of the IoT system. Using the textual notation of a JSON file, a visual
notation will be incorporated into the next versions of Apparatus in order
to offer a human friendly approach.The skeleton template in JSON format is
presented in Fig. 2.
4 Example of security reasoning
In this section an application of the Apparatus reasoning is presented using
an IoT system implementation of a temperature monitoring application, that is
hosted in a private in house network. The components of the network are the
following: a (1) temperature sensor, a (2) router, a (3) server, that functions as a
database and a data formatter for the database, and a (4) laptop. The temper-
ature sensor gathers environmental data and sends them to the server through
the router. The server formats the data and stores them in its database. The
laptop then requests the information from the database. In Fig. 3 the layout of
the system is shown.
Each of the devices, constitutes an IoT node in Apparatus. For the sake of
brevity the stakeholders of the system are two. The same “person” has installed
and makes use of the devices. He acts as the user as well as the deployer and has
been assigned the id: 01. Another “person” has produced all the devices along
with their software, so he acts as both the manufacturer and the developer of
the system with the id: 02. In Fig. 4, the temperature monitoring system is
expressed in JSON format using Apparatus reasoning.
Security analysis: The security analysis is being conducted using the in-
formation presented in Fig. 4. During this part of the analysis the IoT system
in part of a “microworld”. As explained before, the “microworld” acts as partial
view of the actual security dangers of the real life world.
Fig. 3. Temperature monitoring application layout
The IoT nodes sensor and laptop are parts of the perception layer, as seen
in lines 11 and 112 in Fig. 4. Devices in the perception layer allow physical
access to their users. A security requirement resulting from that information, is
that the nodes sensor and laptop need to be physically secure. Further analysis
shows that both nodes communicate using wireless mediums (lines 19 and 119
in Fig. 4). Wireless mediums have limited range. Moreover all the nodes share
the same user and developer. It can be deduced that all the nodes should be in
close proximity to each other. Meaning that if an attacker has physical access
to one, he probably has access to the other nodes of the system. The security
requirement should be updated to include that all the nodes of the system need
to be physically secure.
The IoT system uses wireless mediums (lines 19, 119 in Fig. 4). A requirement
of wireless transmission is that access should only be allowed to authorised users
and devices. All the nodes share the same manufacturer and developer (lines
7, 8, 28, 29, 48, 49, 68, 69, 88, 89, 108, 109 in Fig. 4). It can be assumed that
some security mechanisms to prevent unauthorised access are in place. Those
mechanisms should be taken into account when implementing the system.
The sensor node takes environmental data as an input (line 14 in Fig. 4). En-
vironmental data are not controlled by the system, and a level of integrity must
be ensured, in order to prevent Denial Of Service attacks or any other kind
of tampering with the network. The security requirement is that environmen-
tal data cannot tamper with the system if they deviate from their expected
behaviour.
Fig. 4. Temperature monitoring system JSON format
One of the server’s functions is to act as database (line 73 in Fig. 4). Databases
take data as an input and store it a specific format.Two security requirements
are elicited from that information. Firstly, database input must be subject to
sanitation, to prevent SQL injection attempts or similar attacks. Secondly, the
contents of the database should only be modified by authorised users and devices
of the system.
The IoT nodes compose a network of devices. Chronological records of any
activity that affects operations, procedures or events of the system must be
kept. That functionality is a default security requirement of any IoT systems in
Apparatus.
The process of security requirements elicitation that was described above
can be automated, by correlating security requirements with values in the IoT
system. The identified security requirements compose a list, with each security
requirement being a separate entry that correlates with IoT values shown in
Fig. 1. An example of the automated security requirements elicitation specific
to the temperature monitoring application is shown in Table. 1.
Table 1. Security requirements elicited from IoT system properties
Security Requirements IoT system properties (lines)
Nodes should be physically
protected
layer: perception (11, 112)
connection: wireless (19, 119)
user/deployer id:01 (all nodes)
developer/manufacturer id:02 (all nodes)
System can only be used by autho-
rised users and devices connection: wireless (19, 119)
Environmental data should not tam-
per with the system input: data_environmental (14)
Database data should only be mod-
ified by authorised users or devices type: database (74)
Input of the database should subject
to sanitation type: database (74)
Nodes must keep chronological
records of any activity that affects
operations, procedures or events of
the system
Default security requirement of IoT
systems
5 Conclusion
This paper, starts by illustrating the importance of proposing a novel model to
facilitate security analysis and reasoning for IoT. Security analysis should be
use a generic approach while being able to be used along with specialized se-
curity methods when needed by the system. In that spirit, the proposed model
should offer its capabilities to any IoT scenario without losing its properties,
while offering enough flexibility for further extensions. In order to investigate se-
curity issues with the use of security requirements engineering, Apparatus was
presented. Apparatus enables reasoning about security in IoT systems from a
system architecture point of view. An IoT system is expressed as a cluster of IoT
nodes, with each node having a set properties, that define its role within the sys-
tem. The information of the system is conveyed in a textual manner, specifically
using JSON format. Using Apparatus, the security analysis of a temperature
monitoring system was undertaken and described in this paper. Despite being
novel and coherent, the current version of Apparatus has a number of limita-
tions. An IoT system is analysed from an architectural view and therefore cannot
offer a comprehensive security analysis. To illustrate the limitations, the concept
of “microworld” was introduced. The “microworld” facilitates security analysis by
emulating a managed environment. Another limitation is the inability to express
certain environments that have unknown variables, such as the Cloud or health
applications. For example, in a Cloud system the internal architecture of the
Cloud platform or its security configurations are not publicly known and as such
cannot be expressed using Apparatus.
In order to mitigate those limitations, our future work with Apparatus aims
to be able to adopt elements of other security requirements engineering methods
by operating in an modular manner based on the different applications that
are investigated. Furthermore, Apparatus elicitation process will be automated
by correlating security requirements with information extracted from the IoT
system.
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